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Abstract
Traditional communication networks consist of large sets of vendor-specific
manually configurable devices. These devices are hardwired with specific control
logic or algorithms used for different network functions. The resulting networks
comprise distributed control plane architectures that are complex in nature,
difficult to integrate and operate, and are least efficient in terms of resource
usage. However, the rapid increase in data traffic requires the integrated use
of diverse access technologies and autonomic network operations with increased
resource efficiency. Therefore, the concepts of Software Defined Networking
(SDN) are proposed that decouple the network control plane from the data-
forwarding plane and logically centralize the control plane. The SDN control
plane can integrate a diverse set of devices, and tune them at run-time through
vendor-agnostic programmable Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).
This thesis proposes software defined cognitive networking to enable intel-
ligent use of network resources. Different radio access technologies, including
cognitive radios, are integrated through a common control platform to increase
the overall network performance. The architectural framework of software de-
fined cognitive networking is presented alongside the experimental performance
evaluation. Since SDN enables applications to change the network behavior and
centralizes the network control plane to oversee the whole network, it is highly
important to investigate SDN in terms of security. Therefore, this thesis finds
the potential security vulnerabilities in SDN, studies the proposed security plat-
forms and architectures for those vulnerabilities, and presents future directions
for unresolved security vulnerabilities. Furthermore, this thesis also investigates
the potential security challenges and their solutions for the enabling technolo-
gies of 5G, such as SDN, cloud technologies, and virtual network functions, and
provides key insights into increasing the security of 5G networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Communication networks are extending the notion of connectivity by linking
diverse sets of devices and services to each other via the Internet. New things
enabled by the Internet of Things (IoT) such as smart home appliances, wearable
devices, sensors, and autonomous cars, as well as online services in various
fields, including medical ICT, agriculture, transportation, logistics, and defense
will utilize communication networks to further improve the quality of human
life. Future networks, therefore, need to be equipped with the ability to handle
numerous, even though challenging, requirements. For instance, IoT provides
the foundational infrastructure for future services, but the foundation of IoT lies
in smart networks [1]. Smart networks use software and network infrastructure
abstractions to configure heterogeneous network environments automatically in
order to fulfill the requirements of future services [2].
However, traditional communication networks have many challenges in terms
of complexity, adaptability, and the user or node mobility [3]. In traditional
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networks, policies that dictate the network operations are mostly implemented
with low-level device configurations. Most of the devices in communication net-
works use complex control protocols that have large sets of tunable parameters.
Vendor-specific manual configurations of a huge number of networked devices,
and tuning the control parameters in large networks, excessively complicate the
operations of networks [4] [5]. Furthermore, these configurations are mostly
prone to human-errors [6], leading to 50 to 80 percent of the network downtime,
the reason being the systems’ complexities [7].
Carrier networks usually rely on vendor-specific hardware platforms. Hence,
network operators end up in vendor lock-ins due to vendor-specific network
control platforms and lack of interoperability between equipment from different
vendors [8]. Since the traffic demands of users and requirements of services
are always changing, the inevitable mix and match of network equipment from
different vendors is becoming a major challenge for network operators. Further-
more, control platforms embedded into network hardware are difficult to up-
grade and result in distributed network control architectures. Such distributed
control architectures lack global resource visibility and increase network com-
plexity. It is demonstrated in [9] that complex network architectures are more
prone to outages due to the increased complexity in network configurations.
The amalgamation of an increasing number of services and devices envisioned
by, for example, IoT will not only further complicate network management but
will also require openness to innovations in order to incorporate new services
and solutions. Next generation networks, such as 5G (5th Generation), aim
to provide very high data rates with extremely low latency, significantly im-
proved Quality of Service (QoS), and accommodate the proliferation of new
and emerging services, as well as an enormous number of devices in mainstream
networks [10]. Moreover, 5G networks will overcome the limitations of previous
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generations of wireless networks in terms of integrating low power and low data
rate devices [11]. Therefore, the 5G architecture will not be an incremental
advancement of 4G, but a paradigm shift towards very high carrier frequencies
with massive bandwidths, extreme Base Stations (BSs) and device densities,
and will utilize a diverse set of access technologies [12].
5G, therefore, must use different access technologies in a well-coordinated
fashion and without cell-centric designs [13]. The Next Generation Mobile Net-
works (NGMN) alliance [14] also considers cooperative and user-centric design
of multiple Radio Access Technologies (RATs) as one of the key requirements of
5G. However, such use of diverse access technologies will be highly challenging
in traditional distributed network control architectures. In order to cooperate,
the distributed control architectures will synchronize their functions through
extra control signaling, whereas the signaling traffic is increasing 50 percent
faster than the data traffic [15]. For a network a connecting massive number of
IoT devices, the signaling traffic originated by distributed control architectures
will be a huge challenge [13].
Software Defined Networking (SDN) logically centralizes the network con-
trol architecture, relinquishes the need of device-level configurations [16], breaks
the barrier of vendor lock [17], and opens communication networks for innova-
tion [18]. SDN separates the network control from the data forwarding elements.
Thus, the data forwarding elements are rendered in a more simplified form that
can be (re)-programmed through a vendor-agnostic interface such as the Open-
Flow protocol. By implementing the control platforms in software modules and
introducing programmable Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) in net-
work equipment, SDN facilitates fast network features development and deploy-
ment [5]. With the logically centralized control platforms overlooking the data
forwarding elements, SDN facilitate run-time network manipulation through
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programmable APIs and ensures coherent network-wide policy implementation.
Using the centralized control platform, SDN relinquishes the need for manual
per-device configurations and thus reduces the network complexity [16].
The concepts of cognitive networking [19] have been proposed to enable
autonomous network operation. Cognitive networks have the capabilities to ob-
serve a user’s needs, sense the operating environment, and adjust itself accord-
ingly to fulfill the user’s needs in that environment. A Cognitive Radio Network
(CRN), implementing the radio part of cognitive networking, has the capability
to sense free or occupied radio resources (e.g. frequency spectra) and thus enable
intelligent cooperative use of the resources. A full cognitive network also needs
the upper layers to be adjustable at run-time, and thus, Software Adaptable
Network (SAN) elements are required to tune the network at run-time through
software. For example, in spectrum management and mobility functions, all the
layers, including application, transport, network, medium access control and
physical layers are required to cooperate [20].
However, traditional networks have some challenges that remained as the
main barriers in achieving full cognition in an entire network. First, the vertical
integration of networked functions that requires all layers to cooperate [19] is
one example of those challenges. The distributed control architectures due to
the layering intricacies have been further complicating cognition throughout a
network [20]. Second, the vendor-specific manually configurable network de-
vices that require human intervention in the wake of required changes, in other
words, unavailability of SAN elements before the inception of SDN or its most
valuable implementation, i.e. OpenFlow is another example of such challenges.
Since, SDN resolves the challenges associated with traditional layered architec-
tures and device configurations, integrating the concepts of SDN and cognitive
networking opens new frontiers for robust and autonomic network operation
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and management.
1.2 Objectives and scope of the thesis
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to investigate the potential of SDN in future
networks in terms of integrating different access technologies, intelligently shar-
ing resources among the access technologies, and analysis of security in SDNs
and SDN-based future networks.
Decoupling the network architecture from the infrastructure facilitates in-
novations in each, since it breaks the dependency of one on the other, and
thus enables cost-effective network operation, and feature updates and deploy-
ment [21]. SDN abstracts network functions from the infrastructure by decou-
pling the network control and data forwarding planes. By logically centralizing
the network control platform and introducing programmability in networks,
SDN also facilitates autonomic network management [22], and highly flexible
network operation [5]. Therefore, SDN has the potential to provide the robust
communication architecture for future networks and online services [23], [15].
In traditional networks, each BS or eNodeB (eNB) performs independent
resource allocation, scheduling and base band processing, which is not feasible
for the vision of future cellular networks [24]. The backhaul on the other hand
comprises devices that run on vendor-specific manual configurations, have em-
bedded control logic using algorithms to route, control and monitor traffic. The
tight coupling of the control and data forwarding planes makes these devices
extremely rigid to changes and updates, and the distributed control architecture
of wireless networks has resulted in lack of global visibility of network resources
making it difficult to deploy network-wide coherent policies. However, next
generation wireless networks such as 5G must use a combination of RATs to
meet the growing demands of user traffic and traffic generated by IoTs [25].
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Therefore, the first objective of this thesis is investigating the potential of SDN
to enable centralized control of heterogeneous RATs to meet the future traffic
requirements of diverse devices and services.
The growth in wireless systems’ capacity can be attributed to the increased
use of radio spectrum, which will further increase in future wireless networks [26].
However, a major challenge for future wireless networks will be to efficiently
meet the increasing demands for higher network capacity while the spectrum
resource remains scarce [27]. One of the key opportunities in fully utilizing
the available heterogeneity is efficiently sharing spectrum among RATs [28].
By centralizing the network control, SDN offers the opportunity to fully uti-
lize diversity in RATs by effectively sharing spectrum among them at run-time.
Hence, the second objective of this thesis is to investigate dynamic spectrum
sharing through the centralized control framework provided by SDN. The con-
cepts of cognitive networking, that use cognitive radios for intelligently sharing
spectrum, have been combined with SDN to enable cognition from the physical
layer up-to the application layer.
SDN will be the key technology in the next generation networks (e.g. 5G)
to enable applications to utilize the network by exposing network capabilities to
applications through APIs [12]. However, exposing critical network information
to unauthorized applications will have sever security consequences [29]. Thus,
communication networks using the concepts of SDN need thorough analysis of
its security implications. Therefore, the third objective of this thesis revolves
around security of the SDN technology and communication networks that use
SDN. Beginning from investigating security challenges in SDN, this thesis eval-
uates existing security solutions and provides insights into strengthening the
security of SDNs. The thesis also proposes novel security and mobility mecha-
nisms for the OpenFlow implementation of SDN.
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1.3 Contributions of the thesis
The present thesis is based on three journal articles, [II, III, IV], one magazine
article [VI] and two conference papers [I, V]. The author of the thesis has had
the main responsibility of developing the original ideas, implementing the ideas,
generating numerical results, evaluating the performance results and writing
the papers [I, III, IV, VI]. The co-authors have provided constructive criticism
on ideas, guided in implementation, and provided important comments on the
writing. The thesis author in paper [II] was responsible for originating the idea,
developing the testbed for implementing the idea, and evaluating the experimen-
tal results. The author was responsible for formulating the idea and analysing
the results in paper [V]. The main contributions of this thesis are listed below:
1. Architectural framework and performance evaluation of software defined
cognitive networking (Paper I-II).
2. Performance evaluation of SDN-based heterogeneous network architecture
comprising different access technologies (Paper III).
3. Analysis of security challenges in SDN, solutions proposed for those chal-
lenges and future research directions for potential security vulnerabilities
in SDN (Paper IV).
4. Analysis of security challenges and their solutions for the enabling tech-
nologies of 5G, such as SDN, cloud technologies, and virtual network func-
tions (Paper V).
5. Performance evaluation of novel control channel security mechanism for
OpenFlow (Paper VI).
Paper [I] introduces the concept and architectural framework for SDN-based
cognitive networking. The concepts of cognitive networking were mapped against
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the concepts of SDN. The relevant architectural components that could be in-
tegrated were studied. CRN composing the radio components of cognitive net-
working were sought to be integrated with the SDN controller. Hence, a testbed
was developed and various experiments were carried out. The author was re-
sponsible for the creation of the idea of Software Defined Cognitive Network-
ing, outlining the architectural framework, developing the testbed, carrying out
experiments and analyzing the results from the experiments. The co-authors
provided highly valuable comments and directions from the beginning until the
final publication. Dr. Suneth Namal helped in developing the testbed and
guided in evaluating the results. Professor Andrei suggested that I perform and
validate the idea through real-time experiments. Professor Mika Ylianttila and
Professor Andrei Gurtov were the supervisors.
Paper [II] continues the work started in paper [I] by extending the experi-
mental setup with a resource allocation application, performing new experiments
and shedding more light on SDN-based centralized radio resource control and
allocation. The author is responsible for extending the idea of the prior paper,
defining the test setup and analyzing the evaluation results. Dr. Suneth Namal
was the main contributor to the work and to the paper. He helped in devel-
oping the experimental setup and analyzing the results from the experiments.
Mr. Markku Jokinen and Mr. Saad Saud also helped in developing the testbed
setup. Professor Andrei Gurtov provided valuable comments and suggestions.
Paper [III] proposes a centralized control framework for future heteroge-
neous wireless networks. The main goal of the work is to integrate and use
different radio access technologies with SDN-based centralized control platform.
The paper provides valuable research directions on how to enable mobility and
dynamically adjust the security parameters in future wireless networks. The au-
thor is responsible for developing the idea, proposing the network architecture,
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performing experiments, and evaluating the results of experiments. Dr. Mad-
husanka Liyanage was responsible for performing the experiments of security
architecture and Dr. Laszlo Bokor was responsible for performing the experi-
ments on mobility. Professor Mika Ylianttila and Professor Andrei Gurtov were
the supervisors and provided valuable suggestion and research directions.
Paper [IV] provides a thorough study of security in SDN. The paper provides
an overview of SDN and security features of previous programmable networking
proposals. Since SDN enables programmability and logically centralizes the net-
work control plane, security analysis of SDN is highly important due to its vast
role in future networks. The study presents security challenges in SDN by out-
lining the challenges associated with each of the three planes, i.e. application,
control and data planes, and interfaces. Security solutions for the mentioned
challenges in each plane are studied and categorized with respect to each plane
and interface. The potential of SDN in strengthening network-wide security and
how SDN can help improve the performance of security functions and systems
such as content inspection, access control and network resilience, etc. is stud-
ied. A brief analysis of the potential of SDN for cloud and virtual networks,
and the costs involved in using SDN-based security solution is provided. Var-
ious solutions for strengthening network security and the remaining loopholes
according to the security dimensions of the International Telecommunication
Union-Telecommunication sector (ITU-T) are presented. Future directions for
addressing the potential and unresolved security challenges are also provided.
The author was responsible for conducting the literature survey, selecting arti-
cles and writing the paper. Dr. Suneth Namal provided useful suggestion for
improving the readability of the article. Professor Mika Ylianttila and Professor
Andrei Gurtov were the supervisors.
Paper [V] describes a security framework for the control information channel
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between the SDN control and data planes. The paper proposes using Host
Identity Protocol based solution for the control channel instead of Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol to not only improve the security of the control
channel, but also improve mobility in the OpenFlow architecture of SDN. The
author was responsible for formulating the idea and analyzing the experimental
results to evaluate the performance of the proposed idea. Dr. Suneth Namal was
the main contributor of the work and of the paper. Professor Mika Ylianttila
and Professor Andrei Gurtov were the supervisors.
Paper [VI] investigates the potential security challenges in 5G and studies
the proposed solutions for those challenges. The paper also provides important
insights into 5G security to instigate future research work on existing potential
security and privacy vulnerabilities. Since 5G will use different technologies
such as cloud computing, SDN and NFV, the paper investigates the security
challenges associated with each technology and the possible solutions to those
challenges. The paper also highlights the potential privacy challenges and pos-
sible solutions for those challenges. The author was responsible for conducting
the literature survey, collecting the most relevant and important articles and
writing the paper. All the co-authors provided contributions in text, ideas and
finalizing the paper. Professor Mika Ylianttila and Professor Andrei Gurtov
were the supervisors and provided important suggestions in terms of highlight-
ing security challenges and proposed solutions.
In addition to the included original publications, the author of this thesis has
participated extensively in the publication of book chapters, conference papers,
magazine and journal articles. All these publications supplement the research
work presented in this thesis from their own perspectives.
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1.4 Organization of the thesis
This thesis is organized as follows: in this chapter the background of the re-
search topics, the objectives and research scope, as well as a brief summary
of the contributions of this thesis are discussed. In Chapter 2, a literature re-
view of the research topics covered in this thesis is presented. The research
topics include the use of SDN in future wireless networks, and the security chal-
lenges associated with SDN and possible solutions. In Chapter 3, the main
research contributions of the original research publications are summarized, the
significance of the contributions is discussed, and ideas for future research are
presented. This chapter consists of two parts. Part one presents the use of SDN
in future wireless networks. The second part covers the security implications of
using SDN in future networks, including wireless networks. In Chapter 4, some
conclusions are drawn based on the research work presented in this thesis and
future directions for conducting research in the area are highlighted as well.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
In this chapter, an overview of the literature relevant to the scope of the thesis
is discussed. The chapter is divided into four parts. Section 2.1 provides an
overview of SDN, whereas the use of SDN in wireless networks is presented in
Section 2.2. Software defined cognitive networking is discussed in Section 2.3.
The security implications of SDN and its use in future networks are described
in Section 2.4.
2.1 Software defined networks
SDN [30] separates the network control from the data forwarding plane. The
control plane is logically centralized that interacts with the forwarding plane,
e.g. switches and routers through programmable APIs [16]. By decoupling the
control plane, SDN enables innovation in networking enabling programmabil-
ity of the forwarding devices and the control planes. Since the control plane
is softwarized and not embedded in the firmware, new control plane functions
can be deployed at software speed rather than hardware or firmware product
cycles. SDN proposes a three-tier architectural concept comprising the applica-
12
tion, control and data forwarding planes, as depicted in Fig. 2.1 and described
below in more detail:
Figure 2.1: Conceptual architecture of SDN.
• Application Plane: Implements the networking functions such as rout-
ing algorithms, security services and network policy implementation.
• Control Plane: Runs the Network Operating System (NOS), maintains
the global view of the network due to its logically centralized nature, and
provides hardware abstractions to applications in the application plane.
• Data Plane: Also called the infrastructure layer, is the combination
of hardware elements used to forward traffic flows using flow forwarding
instructions from the control plane.
In SDNs, most of the network functions are implemented in applications [31].
The SDN controller maintains a logical map of the network and hides the net-
work complexity from applications through abstractions. The SDN controller
runs the Network Operating System (NOS) [32] overseeing the network resources
much like a computer operating system controlling computer resources. In SDN,
13
the controller controls the forwarding behavior of the forwarding devices such as
the OpenFlow switches. The OpenFlow protocol [33] is the most common and
standardized protocol used between the controller and switches. When a flow
arrives in a switch, the switch forwards the first packet(s) to the controller. The
controller makes decisions on how to route the packets and installs the decisions
in the switch using the OpenFlow protocol [34]. The decisions are in the form
of flow rules describing the action on the packets of that flow. The flow rules
are stored in the flow tables of switches and the controller can change the flow
rules any time.
The switch flow tables also contain other information regarding flows such
as packet counter values, timeout values, flags, etc. which are always visible to
the controller. Using the controller, SDN applications can request flow char-
acteristics such as timeout values or packet samples and use that to tune the
network by generating flow rules. The rules, for example, can be to forward
specific packets to specific ports. The decision of forwarding specific packets to
specific ports might be needed for load balancing or security analysis. In the
case of load balancing, the new egress ports can be connected to less loaded
switches, or other forwarding devices. In the case of security, the new egress
ports might be connected to security middle boxes such as firewalls or Intru-
sion Detection Systems (IDS). Hence, SDN enables software based innovation
in communication networks.
SDN, as a way forward for innovation in communication networks, is not
only accepted by researchers and industry, but also by various standardization
bodies. The Open Network Foundation (ONF) [31] is perceived as the leader
for SDN standardization. One of the major contributions of ONF has been
the OpenFlow [18] switch specification [33]. ONF has also contributed in many
other technical specifications such as the OpenFlow-Config protocol and Open-
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Flow testing specifications. The ITU-T started working in the SDN domain
by launching two Study Groups (SGs) to develop signaling requirements and
protocols, and outlining functional requirements and architectures, and a Joint
Coordination Activity (JCA) to coordinate the work [35]. ETSI started strate-
gic collaboration with ONF for SDN support of NFV in 2014 to accelerate the
adoption of open source SDN [36].
Having the benefits being realized by researchers and industry alike, SDN has
been sought out as the potential problem solver for next generations networks.
Cellular networks, accepting the move towards 5G, are seeking SDN-based so-
lutions to meet the growing user demands within the constraints of CapEx and
OpEx. Henceforth, the thesis presents the potential of SDN in cellular networks.
2.2 Software defined wireless networks
SDN has been considered as the potential problem solver for many challenges in
existing wireless communication networks [37], [38], [39]. Therefore, there are
many proposals for using the concepts of SDN in wireless networks in general
and cellular networks in particular. The use of SDN in wireless networks got at-
tention from the OpenRoads [40], [41] platform. OpenRoads is an open-source
wireless platform of OpenFlow [18]. The main idea behind OpenRoads is to
enable experimentation of new ideas and solutions in production networks. The
architecture of the OpenRoads consists of flow, slicing and controller that pro-
vide flexible control, virtualization and high-level abstraction. The OpenRoads
architecture has worked as a foundation for many SDN-based cellular network
architecture proposals.
The concepts of SDN can be used in mobile networks in different approaches
which may vary from each other [42]. For example, two approaches that are
different from each other are based on the role of SDN switches. One approach
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suggests maintaining the simplicity of SDN switches having mainly the for-
warding functionality in the switch. All other functions such as local or global
routing control decisions will be computed either in SDN controllers or SDN ap-
plications. The second approach suggests keeping some functionalities, such as
packet header compression and local routing decisions, in switches or routers.
Therefore, there are many approaches, each advocating its own benefits, for
using SDN in cellular networks.
A simplistic, yet promising SDN based architecture for cellular networks
is presented in [4]. The architecture proposes four extensions to enable scal-
able SDN-based network architecture. First, the SDN controller applications
should be capable to express policies using subscriber attributes available in
subscriber information base instead of IP addresses or physical locations. Sec-
ond, each switch should run a controller agent for higher scalability. Third,
switches should also support more functions such as Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI) and header compression. Fourth, base stations should support remote
control of resources for flexible cell management. The proposal is inspired by
the OpenRoads [40], [41] platform.
Mobileflow [8] defines a mobile network architecture called the Software De-
fined Mobile Network (SDMN) architecture. By decoupling the network control
and data planes, the architecture is an attempt to increase the potential of
innovation in mobile networks. The key elements of the system are Mobile
Flow Forwarding Engine (MFFE) and Mobile Flow Controller (MFC). MFEE
is a software controllable, stable and high performing user plane that has the
standard mobile network tunnel processing capabilities. MFC is a logically cen-
tralized control plane that has interfaces to MFFEs, radios, and mobile network
applications. The mobile network applications use the SDN-like north-bound
interface and implement control planes EPC elements such as Mobility Man-
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agement Entity (MME), and Policy and Charging Rules Functions (PCRF).
The benefits of logically centralized control, that has global visibility of net-
work state and higher control over resources, led to proposals for centralizing
the core network elements of cellular networks [43]. Since centralization leads to
scalability challenges, scalable architectures are highly important. SoftCell [44]
is a scalable core network architecture proposed to support fine-grained policy
implementation for mobile devices in cellular networks. Based on the subscriber
attributes and applications, SoftCell enables operators to realize high-level ser-
vice policies to efficiently utilize the resources. Scalability in the core network
is achieved by minimizing the state in core network through aggregation of
forwarding rules.
The concepts of SDN are also extended towards the radio part of cellular
networks. For example, Software Defined Radio Access Network (SoftRAN) [24]
proposes a software defined centralized control plane for radio access networks
(RANs). To avoid the challenges in distributed control planes, SoftRAN intro-
duces centralized control plane for all the RANs in a defined geographical area.
The control plane resides in a big BS that efficiently coordinates radio resource
management among multiple BSs. Having a global view of network resources,
the centralized control platform can efficiently manage interference, load, QoS,
and simplify network management. Using the concept of SDN, CellSDN [45]
attempts to simplify the design and management of cellular data networks.
CellSDN presents various approaches to design new services and prototypes
with the help of open source LTE implementation. Small cell offloading through
cooperative communication in SDN, to meet the growing demands of traffic, is
presented in [46]. An overview of the benefits and research challenges in SDN-
based wireless networks is presented in [37] and [38].
Cognitive networking [19] aims to automate communication networks by
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enabling them to make intelligent decisions. Cognitive networks understand
the environment through feedback cycles and are capable to adjust the work-
ing parameters at run-time and without human interventions [47]. SDN has
the potential to automate communication networks by enabling network pro-
grammability and relinquishing the need of per-device configurations. The log-
ically centralized control framework provided by SDN enables applications to
adjust the operation of a network according to the needs of services. Therefore,
the concepts of cognitive networking and SDN are highly complementary, as
described below, and thus need further investigation. Henceforth, we describe
software defined cognitive networking in the following section.
2.3 Software defined cognitive networking
This section covers the importance of cognitive networking, the challenges faced
by cognitive networking and presents how SDN can be a potential problem
solver for those challenges.
2.3.1 Cognitive networks
Cognitive capabilities or cognition means relating to or involving conscious intel-
lectual activity of thinking, reasoning, or remembering [48], [49]. Extending such
capabilities to communication networks, cognitive networks have the capability
to perceive the current network conditions, plan, decide and act accordingly [19].
The main reason cognitive capabilities are proposed for communication net-
works, besides others, is the lack of adaptability of communication systems to
changing environments in or around the networked systems. The changing envi-
ronment maybe due to changing network conditions such as congestion in some
nodes, changes in services, user movements, and changes in security settings or
policies.
18
A cognitive network has three layers, as presented in Fig. 2.2. The end-
to-end goals derive the behavior of the entire system and are specified by the
network users, resources or applications [50]. The end-to-end goals are pro-
vided to the cognitive process in the cognition layer by a specification language.
The cognition layer consists of the cognitive process that is responsible for the
actual decision making based on the input from the end-to-end goals and the
current network status. Updates from the network are provided either by net-
work APIs or sensors. The Software Adaptable Network (SAN) layer consists
of configurable network elements that can be tuned at run time by the cognitive
process.
Figure 2.2: The cognitive network framework.
Cognitive networks aim to automate communication networks in order to
respond to changes in the environment without or least possible human inter-
vention. Cognition, in communication networks, is intended to provide better
end-to-end performance; improve resource management, QoS and security; and
fulfill other network goals. Efficient resource management according to the user
needs and resource availability has been a major challenge for network opera-
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tors. In cellular networks, the most important and scarce resource has been the
frequency spectrum. Cognitive Radio (CR) systems, using cognition in radio
nodes, offers a solution to the challenge by enabling spectrum sharing among
users at run-time [51].
A full cognitive network can be realized with the help of CRN to enable
cognition at the radio or access part of the network [52]. CRNs consist of primary
and secondary cognitive users. Primary users are the primary license holders
of the spectrum band. The secondary users use the spectrum of the primary
users when it is not needed by the primary users. Both types of users use their
cognitive capabilities to communicate and share the spectrum without harming
each other. The main motivation behind the emergence of such cognition is
the apparent lack of spectrum in the growing demands of higher bandwidth by
diverse types of services [51].
2.3.2 Challenges faced by cognitive networks
Cognitive networks did not realize into practical deployment because of sev-
eral challenges related to the complexity of cognitive systems [52], [19], security
challenges [53] [54] [55], routing complexity [56] and limitations in the underly-
ing network equipment [19], [57]. In the scope of this thesis, we focus on two
challenges: first, complexity of cognitive systems, and second, limitations in the
underlying network elements.
R.W. Thomas et al. [19], the main proponents of cognitive networking, de-
scribe that implementing cognitive systems requires a highly complex system in
terms of architecture, operation and overhead. Thus, the designed system must
outweigh such barriers with performance. The complexity is exacerbated by the
limited adaptability of the underlying network elements [19], [58]. Cognitive
networks require configurable network elements that can be tuned at run-time,
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as shown in Fig. 2.2. In cognitive networks, mobility can be due to changes
in the operational frequency of a node besides physical mobility of the node
or UE. Similarly, CR terminals need to know the neighboring user activity, its
capability, and network topology and parameters through extra control signal-
ing while hopping between the frequency channels [20]. This needs extending
the routing tables to include context-specific information such as frequency and
propagation parameters, indicators of link quality, and end-to-end performance
metrics [59].
In traditional networks, these capabilities would require strong cross-layer
interaction among the vertical layers. However, interaction among the isolated
layers is not only complicating the overall system, but is also highly challenging
from the perspectives of overall costs of the system [60]. Furthermore, fre-
quent frequency hopping will require very fast re-routing. Cross-layer designs
for such frequent interactions between the physical and network layer will result
in sub-optimal performance [61]. Moreover, with security vulnerabilities such as
spoofing, the cross layer interaction might bring down the whole network [62].
Therefore, new networking technologies or concepts that can solve these chal-
lenges might pave the way for implementing cognitive networking. Henceforth,
various proposals for SDN-based cognitive networking are discussed below.
2.3.3 Software defined cognitive networks
The benefits of cognitive networking can be reaped mainly when the system
performance outweighs the design costs [19]. SDN simplifies the overall network
architecture by decoupling the network control and data planes, providing infras-
tructure abstractions and logically centralizing the control plane. Furthermore,
SDN also disintegrates the traditional layered architectures of communication
networks. SDN compliments the concepts of cognitive networking in terms of
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adjusting or tuning the network at run-time and providing means for network
automation, as depicted in Fig. 3.2. Since SDN removes the implementation
barriers of cognitive networking, the technological concepts of both must be in-
tegrated to attain the benefits of both. For example, intelligent cognitive radios
coupled with adaptable OpenFlow-based network can achieve fully dynamic and
automated network operations. Having said that, very limited work is done in
this area and very few proposals and architectural concepts with limited appli-
cability are available.
Figure 2.3: Cognitive network and corresponding SDN architectural frame-
works.
A software defined virtualization framework for CRNs using SDN is pre-
sented in [63]. The proposed framework reduces the control overhead in overlap-
ping cells BSs by relegating some responsibilities to end-nodes. Similarly, [64]
proposes a Software Defined-Cognitive Radio Network (SD-CRN) framework
that enables virtualization-based resource allocation. Using multi-layer hyper-
visors, this framework also proposes relegating management responsibilities from
CRN BSs to UEs. Both of these proposals are theoretical frameworks evaluated
through simulations. The studies in [63] and [64] are very limited in scope.
22
The focus is only on the wireless channels and interference avoidance in wireless
channels. Neither of the studies mentions the architecture beyond radio nodes.
A Joint Sub-carrier and Power Allocation (JSPA) scheme using SDN is pro-
posed in [65] to reciprocally provide benefits to secondary users while coop-
erating with primary users. The main focus of the work is to maximize the
transmission rate of the secondary user while maintaining the required QoS of
primary user. This is also limited to the physical layer wireless channels, whereas
modern networks require to be reconfigurable at all layers, which will be the key
need of next-generation of wireless networks and services [66]. For example, the
routing protocols and QoS parameters must be adjusted when changes in the
radio layer, such as changes in operating frequency, occur.
Therefore, the work presented in this thesis aims to synchronize the dy-
namism of smart physical layer devices, such as cognitive radios, with the upper
layers, such as backhaul devices, using SDN. The main focus of the work is
increasing the overall system performance with the help of logically centralized
control plane, programmable north and south-bound APIs, and configurable
network elements integrated with cognitive radios. Furthermore, compared to
the previous work done in this area, this thesis provides experimental evalua-
tion of the SDN-based Heterogeneous Network (HetNet) that enables resource
(spectrum) sharing, and provides mobility and security with reduced signaling
overhead.
However, SDN-based architectures must be carefully designed since such ar-
chitectures have their own limitations and challenges. For example, centralizing
the network control and enabling programmability of networked devices might
open serious security challenges besides other challenges such as scalability, de-
lay and availability [67]. In the scope of this thesis, the security challenges
and solutions in SDNs and SDN-based network architectures such as 5G are
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presented below.
2.4 Security in software defined networks
SDN enables innovation in communication networks by opening the network
for programmability. Similarly, SDN centralizes the network control for better
resource visibility, simple network management, coherent network policy en-
forcement and ease in new function deployment, etc. However, if overlooked,
the same features can make SDNs highly vulnerable to security threats [68], [69].
For example, the centralization of the control plane makes it a favorite choice
for Denial of Service (DoS) [70], [71] and saturation attacks [72], [73]. Similarly,
programmable networks have been prone to security vulnerabilities [74], [75],
[76]. Active Networking [77], [78] is one of the most prominent examples of
programmable network architectures that is not used due its vulnerable nature
to security threats. Indeed, security is a major challenge, and thus the security
working group has been set up by ONF [79] to avoid such challenges in SDN.
Therefore, it is highly important to investigate the security challenges in
SDNs and seek solutions for those challenges. A detailed description of se-
curity challenges in SDN and proposed solutions are provided in Paper [V],
and [79], [68]. Security challenges in software defined mobile networks are high-
lighted in [67]. In this section, the main security challenges and proposed so-
lutions are highlighted, mainly to convey the serious implications of security
concerns related to SDNs.
2.4.1 Security challenges in software defined networks
To make it more comprehensible, the security challenges and solutions can be
elaborated for each of the three SDN planes and the interfaces between them.
The three planes, as already described, are the application, the control, and the
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data planes. The interface between the application and control planes is termed
as the north-bound interface, and the one between the control and data planes
is called the south-bound interface. A detailed analysis of security of SDNs is
provided in Paper [IV]. In this section, the main security challenges are briefly
discussed and highlighted in Table 1 with respect to the SDN planes.
Application plane security challenges
As described earlier, applications implement most of the network functional-
ity without being tied to the network. Therefore, security of applications has
big implications in SDNs. Applications must be authenticated and authorized
before generating flow rules. However, there are no established authorization
mechanisms between the controller and applications, as demonstrated in [80].
Different applications have different privileges, thus, a security model must be
put to isolate applications [81]. In this case also, there are no compelling mech-
anisms to provide differentiated access to applications based on their privileges.
The challenge is further complicated by nested applications [82] in which keeping
track of a malicious application in a legitimate application is highly challenging.
Furthermore, no mechanisms are defined for accountability of nested applica-
tions [83].
Control plane security challenges
The SDN controller must authenticate applications before providing network
stats to applications. The controller, however, is facing many security challenges
itself. Centralizing the network control into the controller means a huge num-
ber of requests from applications and the underlying controlled devices. This
can make the controller a potential bottleneck due to scalability or resource
limitations [81]. This scalability limitation will open doors for DoS attacks. A
network fingerprinting method has been used in [84] to identify a network as an
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Table 2.1: Major security threats in SDN
SDN
Plane or
Layer
Type of Threat Description
Application
Plane
Lack of authentica-
tion & authoriza-
tion
No compelling authentication & autho-
rization mechanisms for applications and
more threatening in case of a large num-
ber of third-party applications.
Fraudulent flow
rules insertion
Malicious or compromised applications
can generate false flow rules and it is diffi-
cult to check if an application is compro-
mised.
Lack of access con-
trol & accountabil-
ity
Difficult to implement access control
& accountability on third-party applica-
tions and nested applications that con-
sume network resources.
Control
Plane
DoS attacks Visible nature, centralized intelligence
and limited resource of the control plane
are the main reasons for attracting DoS
attacks.
Unauthorized con-
troller access
No compelling mechanisms for enforcing
access control on applications.
Scalability & avail-
ability
Centralizing intelligence in one entity will
most likely have scalability and availabil-
ity challenges.
Data
Plane
Fraudulent flow
rules
Data plane is dumb and hence more sus-
ceptible to fraudulent flow rules.
Flooding attacks Flow tables of OpenFlow switches can
store a finite or limited number of flow
rules.
Controller hijack-
ing or compromise
Data Plane is solely dependent on the
control plane that makes the data plane
security dependent on controller security.
TCP-Level attacks TLS is susceptible to TCP-level attacks.
Man-in-the middle
attack
This is due to optional use of TLS, and
complexity in configuration of TLS.
SDN and launch attack. Knowing that the switch has to send the flow setup
request to the controller for each new flow, a DoS attack can be easily targeted
towards the controller. To sum up, the controller is the most crucial part of
SDN, on the one hand, and the most vulnerable to security attacks such as DoS
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and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks, on the other hand.
Data plane security challenges
The SDN data plane, such as the OpenFlow switches, stores flows after sending
the first packet to the controller for setting up the flow rules. The flow tables
that maintain the flow rules, and the buffer that store the unsolicited flows,
have physical capacity limitations. These limitations can also be exploited to
launch a DoS attack against the OpenFlow switches, as demonstrated in [84].
Furthermore, the forwarding devices in SDN are rendered simple and are highly
dependent on the controller. This means that the forwarding devices have no
capability to differentiate between genuine and flawed or malicious flow rules.
Similarly, if the controller is compromised, failed, or the link to the controller
is broken, the data plane will be naturally compromised or will become non-
responsive to newly arriving flows.
Interfaces security challenges
The OpenFlow switch specification [85] suggests Transport Layer Security (TLS) [86]
and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [87] for the south-bound inter-
face, i.e. the OpenFlow protocol. However, the standard of TLS is not specified
and the security feature is left optional [68]. In the OpenFlow vulnerability
assessment study [88], it is described that the optional use of TLS leaves the
control channel between controllers and switches open to security threats such
as man-in-the-middle attack and fraudulent rule insertions. Furthermore, the
configuration of TLS is highly complex, making it a technical barrier for oper-
ators to use it [88]. Hence, security of the south-bound API in SDN is still an
open research challenge. The north-bound interface, on the other hand, has no
explicitly defined security architectures. More specifically, communication be-
tween remote applications and the controller is not even properly investigated.
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Hence, this is also an open research challenge.
2.4.2 Security solutions for software defined networks
By centralizing the network intelligence and enabling network programmability,
SDN facilitates quick identification and remediation of security threats. This in-
teresting feature of SDN, the global network stats visibility and control, supports
run-time security monitoring, analysis and response through a cycle of harvest-
ing intelligence from the data forwarding elements using programmable APIs.
In contrast to the distributed control in network elements requiring perimeter-
based expensive security systems that often have contradictory security poli-
cies, SDN enables coherent network-wide security policy enforcement. With
software-based systems, SDN brings forth the idea of software-defined security
to experiment and innovate novel security systems, as presented in [89]. As an
example, FLOWGUARD [90] is a comprehensive software firewall framework
for OpenFlow networks that ensures consistent firewall policy implementation
throughout the network.
The OpenFlow SDN architecture offers control over the forwarding elements
from centralized control point where security services insertion is simplified. For
example, security applications can request the packet samples through the con-
troller using simple sampling mechanisms such as FleXam [91] that sends full or
part of packets to the control based on counter values in the switch. An appli-
cation can perform analysis and then through the controller can change the flow
rules such as drop consecutive packets of a particular flow due to suspicion based
on security analysis of the application. Therefore, a number of proposals have
been put forward for security of SDNs and securing communication networks
while leveraging the concepts of SDN. Below we describe the security solutions
with respect to the SDN planes and present some of the major platforms and
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proposals in Table 2. The platforms outlined in Table 2 are discussed in Paper
[VI] in detail.
Table 2.2: Security solutions for SDN
SDN
Plane
Security Solu-
tion
Targeted Threat Solution Type
Application
Plane
FRESCO [89] Threats within/from
applications
Security applications de-
velopment framework
PermOF [92] Access control Applications permission
system
Assertion [93] Flow rules contradic-
tion
Applications debugging
framework
Flover [94] Security policy viola-
tion
Security policy verifica-
tion application
OFTesting [95] Faulty OF programs Applications testing
framework
Control
Plane
SE-Floodlight
[96]
Applications autho-
rization
Secure controller archi-
tecture & secure App-
Ctrl API
Hybrid Ctrl [97] Controller scalability Hybrid (reac-
tive/proactive) con-
troller architecture
DISCO [98], [99] Controller scalability Distributed controller ar-
chitecture
Ctrl-Placement
[100], [101], [102]
Controller availabil-
ity
Controller placement
frameworks
HyperFlow [103] Controller availabil-
ity
Distributed control plane
DoSDetection
[104]
DDoS attack Detection framework
Data
Plane
FortNOX [105] Flow rules contradic-
tions
Controller framework
FlowChecker
[106]
Faulty flow rules Configuration verifica-
tion tool
VeriFlow [107] Faulty flow rules Network debugging tool
Resonance [108] Access control Access control & policy
enforcement framework
CPRecovery [71] Controller availabil-
ity
Controller replication
framework
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Security solutions for applications
In SDN, mechanisms that authenticate and authorize applications, and verify
the flow rules generated by such applications are highly important. Opera-
tionCheckpoint [109] and PermOF [92] are systems that allocate permissions
to applications and set limits on the operations of applications. The proposed
mechanisms authorize applications for specific actions and thus can prevent non-
authorized modifications of flow rules. One of the main benefits of the proposed
system in OperationCheckpoint [109] is to secure the north-bound interface,
thus, delimiting applications to work in the defined jurisdiction. An assertion
language that supports verifying and debugging SDN applications is proposed
in [93]. The mechanisms proposed in [93] also enable verifying flow rules dy-
namically as the rules are produced by applications. For developing security
applications, FRESCO [89] provides a framework to rapidly develop and deploy
OpenFlow security applications.
Security solutions for controllers
Since the controller plays a crucial role in SDNs, there are many proposals and
solutions that strengthen the controller security. The requirements of robust,
secure and resilient SDN controllers are presented in [110], alongside the analysis
of the gap between security level of current controllers and potential security so-
lutions. Security of the SDN controller is, in fact, multi-folded requiring security
solutions for both interfaces, solutions to mitigate saturation attacks through
increased scalability, DoS or DDoS attack-specific solutions and reliable con-
troller placement. Security-enhanced (SE) Floodlight controller [96] is a secure
version of the OpenFlow Floodlight controller [111]. SE Floodlight controller
secures the northbound API, authenticates and authorizes applications and ver-
ifies flow rules. There are also northbound API-specific security solutions such
30
as OperationCheckpoint [109], and mechanisms to increase trust relationship
between controllers and applications, as demonstrated in [112]. FortNOX [105]
improves the NOX controller [113] to avoid contradictions in flow rules generated
by applications.
To avoid the single point of failure problem, distributed yet logically cen-
tralized controllers are proposed. For example, HyperFlow [103] proposes a
scalable event-based multi-controller architecture. Multiple distributed con-
trollers, being logically centralized, take local decisions to minimize latency in
flow setup. Increasing scalability through increasing processing capabilities of
the controllers is another approach to avoid saturation attacks [114]. To secure
the controller from being fingerprinted for saturation or DoS attacks, AVANT-
GUARD [115] introduces connection migration for the data plane to remove
failed TCP sessions and thus reduce the number of data plane to control plane
interactions. For reliable controller placement, there is no one-fits-all way [116],
but a tradeoff among desired goals such as order of redundancy vs reliability
and reliability vs. latency [101].
Security solutions for data plane
The data plane security solutions range from security of the interfaces, and flow
tables to network planning and segmentation. Standardizing and mandating the
security proposals such as the versions of TLS and DTLS are the potential solu-
tions to the interface or link layer security. TLS, when properly configured, can
provide privacy and data integrity between two communication parties such as
the controller and data forwarding elements. Furthermore, cryptographic secu-
rity protocols such as Host Identity Protocol (HIP)-based solutions [117], [118]
can ensure both payload and control information security [119].
The security of flow tables can be ensured by flow rules verification mecha-
nisms as described in [105], [107], [120] besides authentication and authorization
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mechanisms for applications that generate flow rules, as described in the previ-
ous sections. Proper network planning and segmentation is necessary to avoid
over-provisioning of the control plane that can cause controller saturation ren-
dering the data plane non-responsive to network traffic and new flow arrivals.
Resilience mechanisms enabling the network to operate in case of controller
failure [121], controller-switch link failure [122], and disruption-free controller
replacement [123] are proposed to keep the data plane forwarding intact under
such circumstances.
2.4.3 Using SDN to improve security of communication
networks
SDN simplifies both development and deployment of novel security systems due
to the programmable nature of its network components and centralized control
of traffic traversing the network [124]. By providing packet level information
access to the controller and applications on top of it, SDN enables real-time
traffic monitoring and response to abnormal traffic behavior. Packet-level traf-
fic analysis has been challenging in traditional networks due to large volume of
traffic, for example in large Data Center Networks (DCNs), and the complexity
in tracking multiple network components [125]. Indeed, SDN brings an opportu-
nity for such granularity, yet the centralized control plane needs novel solutions
to avoid congestion. Therefore, scalable per-flow sampling mechanisms [126] are
proposed to operate at line-rate in the data plane while maintaining fair load
on the controller.
The simplicity of implementation and deployment of new services such as
Multi-protocol Label Switching (MPLS) Virtual Private Networks (MPLS VPNs)
is demonstrated in [127]. The benefits of centralized control for secure cloud
computing, and cellular networks are described in [128], [129] and [130], [131], [132], [133],
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respectively. Benefiting from the concepts of SDN for improving anomaly de-
tection systems in small and home networks is demonstrated in [134]. The
OpenSafe [135] system using A Language for Arbitrary Route Management for
Security (ALARMS) to route traffic to monitoring systems is an example of
economical deployment of security monitoring systems in SDN. The adequacy
of SDN has also been proved for deploying security middle boxes without chang-
ing the network architecture or modification in middle boxes, as demonstrated
in [136]. Using SDN, [137] explores new opportunities to deal with the chal-
lenges in network forensics systems. The solution proposes Provenance Verifica-
tion Point component to observe covert communication between compromised
nodes. The interesting theme of the work is using the network itself as an ob-
server, leveraging the centralized SDN control plane obtaining information from
switches distributed in the network.
2.4.4 Open source security
ONF has published three security Technical recommendations; i) Security Foun-
dation Requirements for SDN controllers, ii) Threat Analysis for the SDN Ar-
chitecture, and iii) Principles and Practices for Securing Software-Defined Net-
works [138]. On the development side, there are many open source security de-
velopment projects alongside the open source SDN development projects. The
OpenFlowSec [139] consortium has built the SDN security suite by extending
the Floodlight [111] OpenFlow controller. The software suite includes a security
actuator to invoke refined security logic, and a Bothunter to perform passive se-
curity analysis in OpenFlow networks. The OpenDayLight foundation [140] ini-
tiated the project AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) [141]
to develop security modules to authenticate identities, authorize access, and
maintain the records of access to resources.
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Chapter 3
Summary of the original
articles
This chapter briefly summarizes the research work published in the journal
articles and conference proceedings. The work has been divided into two sec-
tions. Section 3.1 describes using SDN for integrating diverse RATs, enabling
intelligent resource sharing, and providing cost efficient mobility and security
parameters adjustments in future networks. Section 3.2 describes the security
challenges in SDN and the opportunities in terms of security in using SDN in
future networks.
3.1 SDN-based cognitive and heterogeneous net-
working
Papers [I, II, III] discuss the need of dynamic network systems and propose fu-
turistic network architectures using the concepts of SDN. Using SDN, a HetNet
architecture has been the main focus that use cognitive networking and multiple
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access technologies to meet the demands of future services. Cognitive networks
sense the current state and context, adapt to contextual changes and apply con-
trol loop systems to learn and update itself for future actions without human
intervention [142]. Such systems require cross-layer interactions, as shown in
the right-hand side of Fig. 3.1. Therefore, the idea of Knowledge Plane (KP),
spanning across all layers, as shown in the left-hand side of Fig. 3.1, is proposed
by Clark et al. [143]. The main idea of the KP proposal is to make the network
self and surrounding-aware, capable to learn, make decisions and act on those
decisions [52].
Figure 3.1: The knowledge plane and cross-layer interaction among the layers.
However, strict isolation between the vertical layers made it difficult to real-
ize KP like architectures or cross layer interaction. For example, the cross-layer
interaction requires the network to modify one or several layers of the network
stack in its member nodes at run-time. This and other challenges such as man-
ual configurations, as described in Section 3.2, are already solved by SDN. A
simplified architectural mapping of the concepts of both technologies is pre-
sented in Fig. 3.2. Therefore, Paper [I] investigates the possibility of integrating
the concepts of SDN and cognitive networking, and provides the initial results.
Paper [II] extends the concepts by developing a fully automated SDN-based
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cognitive network. Furthermore, Paper [III] focuses on using SDN for enabling
a heterogeneous network architecture that provides mobility between different
RATs, dynamically adjusts security parameters, as well as dynamically shares
spectrum among multiple user nodes.
Figure 3.2: Cognitive networking and corresponding SDN architectural frame-
works.
3.1.1 Towards software defined cognitive networking
Paper [I] proposed the idea of combining the concepts of SDN and cognitive
networking for efficient and dynamic use of resources (e.g. spectrum). Cognitive
Radio (CR) implements the physical layer part of the cognitive networks, making
a CRN capable to sense a free or unused spectrum and use that during the
time it is available (more details about CR in Papers [II, III]). By removing
the layering intricacies and centralizing decision making, SDN makes the idea
of a whole cognitive network realistic. The architectural concepts of cognitive
networking and SDN are mapped, as shown in Fig. 3.2. Both concepts facilitate
network automation, albeit the differences from the implementation point of
view. Therefore, the outcome has been of great interest.
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A testbed was developed that enabled the control of CRs through the SDN
controller. The three main parts of the testbed were a CRN, OpenFlow wireless
network, and the Floodlight OpenFlow controller-based SDN control plane. The
cognitive engine, working as the spectrum sharing decision making entity, was
attached to the SDN controller and the base stations. The details of the testbed
(Fig. 3.3) implementation are given in Paper [I]. The main aim of this initial
research was to evaluate the potential of SDN in controlling the radio resources
using CRs. The experimental results revealed the performance improvement in
terms of throughput, QoS, and delay, as presented in Paper [I].
Figure 3.3: SDN-based cognitive radio network test setup.
To provide an overview of the performance improvement, the throughput
measurement results are depicted in Fig. 3.4. The measurements are taken
between the OpenFlow and cognitive clients. TCP traffic was generated be-
tween the clients on one and eight frequency channels. Using a single frequency
channel, the average throughput remained 1.15 MBps, whereas using cognition
among the eight frequency channels, the average throughput increased to 3.5
MBps. Similarly, the average round-trip-time (RTT) for TCP packets and the
corresponding ACK (Acknowledgment) packets between the clients remained
well below 20ms, as shown in Fig. 3.5.
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Figure 3.4: TCP throughput in a cognitive environment.
3.1.2 Implementation of full OpenFlow based CRN
Paper [II] describes the implementation of OpenFlow based CRN architecture.
In this work, we realized that the end-to-end goals defined in cognitive network-
ing can be implemented in the application plane or the network management
plane. Those end-to-end goals can be deployed through the control plane in
the underlying network using the north and south-bound APIs. The cognitive
process can be implemented as an application or as a software module in the
control plane. SAN elements can be realized as OpenFlow switches that are
tunable at run-time by the controller using the south-bound API, for example,
the OpenFlow protocol. By sensing the free spectrum, cognitive radios can
provide the sensed information to the cognitive process using the same API.
Therefore, the work presented in Paper [II] integrates software defined radio
(SDR)-based CRs to SDN-based control plane. The aim is to synchronize the
dynamism of SDN-based control platforms with the dynamism of cognitive ra-
dios for the efficient use of resources (spectrum in our case). Hence, the testbed
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Figure 3.5: Round-trip time between OpenFlow and cognitive clients.
was extended that integrated the concepts and technological components of
SDNs and cognitive networks, as presented in Fig. 3.6. In the testbed, the Base
Station (BS) was modified to work in a fashion similar to an OpenFlow switch,
e.g. maintain a flow table which can be updated or modified by the OpenFlow
controller. A Cognitive Engine (CE) working as an OpenFlow application is
integrated into the SDN controller. The controller installs the flow rules based
on the decisions from the CE.
Figure 3.6: Extended testbed implementation for OpenFlow-based CRN.
The performance of the proposed architecture was evaluated in terms of la-
39
tency in flow setup, QoS for VoIP calls, and measurement of response times
between different network segments. For brevity, I will describe the VoIP per-
formance in terms of latency and call rate per second that highlights the number
of successful calls per second in different scenarios. Detailed evaluation of the
experimental results is presented in Paper [II]. The latency requirement for VoIP
call is 150 ms, although 151 ms to 300 ms might be an acceptable one-way de-
lay [144]. Therefore, we consider 150 ms RTT between the two clients as the
threshold and calls with delays above the threshold are dropped. As shown
in Fig. 3.7, the call drop rate is very low when the resources are not shared
among two cognitive clients. Though the call drop rate increases when two cog-
nitive clients share the resources, however, our main aim is sharing resources
dynamically among the clients using SDN-based centralized control framework.
Figure 3.7: Network performance results in different scenarios.
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3.1.3 Enabling heterogeneity in cellular networks using
SDN
Paper [III] presents a HetNet architecture leveraging SDN. Next generations of
mobile networks, such as 5G, will need to use multiple RATs together to extend
the connectivity to existing and newly invented digital devices [25]. However,
the static nature of communication networks having loosely coordinated dis-
tributed control planes with no global visibility of network states and resources
made it difficult to harmonize diverse RATs into a single domain. By bringing
programmability in communication networks and logically centralizing the net-
work control planes by separating it from the data forwarding plane, SDN made
it possible to use a mix and match of different network equipment from differ-
ent vendors. Therefore, Paper [III] proposes a HetNet architecture, as shown in
Fig. 3.8, leveraging the concepts of SDN.
Figure 3.8: SDN-based heterogeneous network architecture.
The HetNet architecture integrates different access technologies such as cog-
nitive base stations, WLAN, and a wired network into the SDN-based cen-
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tralized control platform. The paper sheds light on how resources can be dy-
namically allocated in such architectures. Furthermore, the paper presents a
proactive SDN-based mobility management scheme between different access net-
works. Media Independent Handover (MIH) [145] scheme is used to optimize
handovers among the networks. The performance evaluation and comparative
analysis show that the proposed mechanisms yield better throughput and packet
loss results than the standard MIP based scheme, as depicted in Fig. 3.9. From
the point of security, the proposed dynamic security tunnel management scheme
drastically minimizes the signaling costs for secure IPSec tunnel establishment
between backhaul devices (OpenFlow switches in our case).
Figure 3.9: TCP throughput of standard MIPv6-like vs. the proposed proactive
SDN-based mobility management solution.
3.2 Security of future networks using SDN
Paper [IV] presents a thorough study of security challenges in SDN, the proposed
solutions for those challenges, and the use of SDN in strengthening network-
wide security. The study also finds the potential security challenges that still
expose the network to security vulnerabilities and provides future directions for
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strengthening security of SDNs. One of the main open challenges in SDN is that
of the control channel between the control and data planes. Therefore, Paper
[V] presents a security scheme for the control channel. Paper [VI] presents the
security analysis of 5G networks. The security challenges that will be faced by
the most important technologies used in 5G and the solutions for each of the
technology are presented. The articles are summarized below.
3.2.1 Security analysis of SDN
Paper [IV] presents a study of the security challenges in SDN, the solutions
proposed for those challenges, outlines the benefits of SDN for strengthening
network security, and provides future directions for improving security of SDNs.
Programmable networks have been prone to security challenges, and SDN is no
exception. Therefore, it is highly important to investigate the loopholes and
design or propose solutions to mitigate the security risks before the deployment
of SDNs. For instance in active networking [77], [78], user injected programs
could change the network behavior without proper authorization. If such behav-
ior is allowed in SDNs, the security challenges will be far more detrimental for
many reasons. For example, SDN has been far more accepted by the industry
and academia leading to its practical deployment to serve digital services that
have penetrated to our social fabric. Thus, the security of SDN circumvented
by compromises in the centralized control of nearly all the network elements
used by digital services can be catastrophic. Remember that SDN applications
can change the network behavior through generating flow configurations and
deploying them in the traffic forwarding elements. Therefore, authentication
and authorization of SDN applications would constitute the basic security re-
quirements.
The paper establishes the need of investigating security in SDNs by out-
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lining the security challenges that existed in the previous proposals of pro-
grammable networking. Security has been the delimiting factor of previous
proposals and thus new or alternative architectures have been proposed that
can enable programmability of network elements securely. The predecessor of
SDN, Ethane [74], considered as the driving force behind the OpenFlow variant
of SDN, had a specific focus on security and considered security as a subset of
network management. Similarly, network-wide coherent policy deployment is
another major consideration in Ethane that is propagated to SDNs. Network-
wide coherent policies established through logically centralizing, the previously
independent and distributed, control planes can avoid security policy contradic-
tions in large networks.
The centralization of the control plane and the programmability introduced
by SDN are deemed highly beneficial for future networks. However, the same
reasons open SDNs for security vulnerabilities. Therefore, the security chal-
lenges that arise due to these two features are properly discussed. Since SDN
simplifies the network forwarding elements by shifting the control or decision-
making capabilities to the controller, these data plane elements are easy to
fingerprint as dependent on the controller. Thus, these elements can be easily
targeted for saturation attacks besides manipulating the optional choice of us-
ing TLS for the control channel security in the OpenFlow protocol. The major
security threats arising due to such vulnerabilities are discussed in the paper.
Networks that are programmable by software yield many benefits and the
most promising one is quick service alteration and insertion [146]. In SDN, the
programmable control plane can be upgraded for security by either writing a
software security logic module into the control plane or integrating a security
monitoring and response application through the north-bound API to the con-
trol plane. SDN facilitates network-wide coherent policies, and thus, network
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security can be as good as the security policies. Security policies are converged
to network-wide configurations through security applications utilizing the SDN
controllers. These reasons led to the concepts of “software-defined security” and
the definition of SDN as “Security-Defined Networking” [79].
The global view of the network status facilitates SDN to quickly identify
a threat through a cycle of harvesting intelligence from the data plane and
promptly respond to the threat. Thus, a network administrator or a security
application can change the network configuration from the logically centralized
control plane at run-time using the programmable APIs in the data forwarding
elements to either block malicious traffic or route suspicious traffic to security
middle boxes, as shown in Fig. 3.10. Using these features of SDN, various se-
curity mechanisms are proposed to secure SDNs and develop security platforms
for various types of networks. Solutions for the security of planes of SDN, and
using SDN to strengthen network-wide security for different types of networks
are discussed in Paper [IV], and outlined in Table 3.1. The security solutions
are tabulated in terms of the addressed threat, and the interface or SDN plane
they secure.
Figure 3.10: Security policy enforcement in SDN.
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Table 3.1: SDN Security Platforms
Platform Solution
Target Plane Interface
App. Ctrl. Data App-
Ctrl
Ctrl-
Data
FRESCO [89] Anomaly detection and mitiga-
tion framework
X X
PermOF [92] Permission control system for
OF Apps.
X X
Assertion [93] App debugging, Flow rules in-
spection
X X
VeriFlow [107] Verify and debug flow rules X
Flover [94] Flow policy verification, iden-
tify bugs in OF programs
X X X
OFTesting [95] App testing and debugging X
SE-Floodlight
[96]
Role-based conflict resolution,
authorization, security audit
system
X X X
DDoSDetection
[104], [147]
SOM-based DDoS attack de-
tection
X X
Reliable Ctrl.
Placement [148]
Controller reliability, switch-
controller connectivity
X X X
Monitoring [149] Data plane connectivity moni-
toring
X X
Flow rules secu-
rity [105], [106]
Configuration analysis and
verification, authorize applica-
tions
X X
DISCO [98], [99] Controller availability, network
monitoring
X
Ctrl.-
Placement
[100], [150]
Controller scalability and
availability
X X
Ctrl.-
Reliability
[102], [103], [151]
Controller reliability, resilience
and availability
X X
CPRecovery
[71]
Controller resilience, switch
connectivity, DDoS attack
X X
The phenomena of global network state visibility and centralized control
combined with programmable network elements have been identified as the po-
tential problem solver for security challenges in many types of networks. For
example, Automated Malware Quarantine (AMQ) [152] uses the concepts of
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SDN to detect potential threats in a data center network and isolate insecure
network elements to stop the spread of security threats. The security modules
implemented as SDN applications monitor the network and respond through
the controller to stop malicious traffic from spreading across the network. Fur-
thermore, CloudWatcher [153] uses OpenFlow to monitor and inspect traffic
flows to ensure security of large and dynamic clouds. Similarly, the concepts
of SDN have been used to secure virtual network components. The Network
Intrusion detection and Countermeasure sElection (NICE) [154] framework use
OpenFlow to monitor and control distributed programmable virtual switches.
Paper [IV] studies the use of SDN for developing such security platforms for
different types of networks.
The International Telecommunication Union’s Telecommunication sector (ITU-
T) [155] has published network security recommendations to protect networks
against all major security threats by defining security dimensions. These dimen-
sions include access control, authentication, non-repudiation, data confidential-
ity, communication security, data integrity, availability and privacy. The study
in Paper [IV] presents the security solutions for each of the seven security dimen-
sions for SDNs, as outlined in Table 3.2. The study also investigates the lack of
stable security solutions for SDNs with respect to each security dimension. For
example, avoiding non-repudiation from SDN applications and the complexity
of TLS configuration are still an open research challenges.
Furthermore, Paper [IV] provides detailed future directions for developing
SDN based security systems and security systems for future SDNs. Since the
concepts of SDN such as split control-data planes architectures and network
abstractions are yet to be used in communication networks, there are still many
gray areas that need further investigation. For example, analysis of a system’s
scalability to enhance the system’s security, mainly in centralized control plat-
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forms, requires further research. Similarly, many of the security problems are
due to the weak notions of identity in the current Internet architecture [156].
The same challenge will also remain in SDN due to the lack of proper mecha-
nisms to bind user identities to traffic flows [69]. Moreover, SDN can also be
used to automate network security, however, security automation using SDN is
yet to be explored.
Table 3.2: SDN Security Solutions According to ITU-T Security Recommenda-
tions
Security
Type
Reference Mechanism used
Access [92] Impose access control on OF apps
Control [89] Enables develop security architectures for
ACL
[157], [108] Access control policy enforcement frame-
work
Authentication [105] Role-based authentication & authorization
[157] Authentication policies & admission con-
trol
Non- [158] Uses permanent user identities (LISP)
Repudiation [119] Uses HIP for permanent identities
[159] Source address validation of packets
Data [160] Random host mutation
Confidentiality [105] Flow rules-legitimacy
[161] Identity-based cryptography
Communication[86] TLS for controller-switch communication
Data In-
tegrity
[162] Traffic isolation-based integrity
[119] IPSec encapsulated security payload (ESP)
[107], [105] Data integrity through flow rule legiti-
macy.
Availability [98], [99] Distribute SDN control plane
[163], [164] Extended processing capabilities
Privacy [160] OpenFlow random host mutation
[162] Traffic-isolation-based privacy
[165] User-selected security procedures
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3.2.2 Control channel security in OpenFlow
Paper [V] proposes Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [117] based security and mo-
bility management scheme for OpenFlow. OpenFlow uses Transport Layer Se-
curity (TLS), and the versions prior to OpenFlow version 1.0 used Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) [166], for the control channel between the controller and data path
elements [167]. However, TLS is susceptible to TCP-level attacks and changing
IP addresses may tear down running sessions [69]. Furthermore, the use of TLS
in OpenFlow is optional, hence the controller-switch communication happens
in plain TCP text, leaving it open for security vulnerabilities such as reset and
sequence prediction attacks. Furthermore, there are no compelling mechanisms
that demonstrate the mobility of OpenFlow switches.
Therefore, the work presented in Paper [V] proposes a novel approach to
handle security and switch mobility in OpenFlow using the global cryptographic
identities introduced by HIP to replace TLS based mutual authentication. The
performance results presented in Fig. 3.11 show the connection establishment
delay between the two approaches. The plain TCP communication has the
lowest delay but is not secure. The default (SSL/TLS) proposed in OpenFlow
version 1.1.0 has an average delay of 66 ms, whereas the proposed HIP-based
mechanisms has an average delay of 44 ms. The def HIP base exchange (HIP-
BEX) provides the highest level of security, but introduces more delay. Further
detailed results of the proposed scheme are presented in Paper [V].
3.2.3 Security analysis of 5G networks
Paper [VI] presents the security threat landscape of 5G networks, as depicted
in Fig. 3.12, the potential solutions for those challenges, and highlights the
existing vulnerabilities to grasp attention for research towards those weaknesses.
The most prominent security challenges highlighted by NGMN alliance [14], 5G
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Figure 3.11: Comparison of security schemes for control channels in SDN.
Infrastructure Public Private Partnership (5G PPP) [168], and most widely
discussed in the literature are:
• Flash network traffic: Generated by a huge number of end-user devices
and new things (IoT) that could lead to unavailability of resources. Such
traffic can also be generated by malicious users to form a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack.
• Radio interface security: Radio interface encryption keys sent over
insecure channels may lead to many security challenges, such as eaves-
dropping, resource stealth, etc.
• User plane integrity: Lacking cryptographic integrity protection for
the user data plane.
• Mandated security in the network: Service-driven constraints on the
security architecture leading to the optional use of security measures.
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Figure 3.12: The security threat landscape of 5G networks.
• Roaming security: User-security parameters are not adjusted during
roaming from between different operator networks, leading to security
compromises.
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on the infrastructure: Lack of
mechanisms to hide visible network control elements, and unencrypted
control channels.
• Signaling storms: Distributed control systems requiring coordination,
e.g. Non-Access Stratum (NAS) layer of Third Generation Partnership
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Project (3GPP) protocols.
• DoS attacks on end-user devices: No proper security measures for
applications, operating systems and configuration data in user devices.
Furthermore, 5G will use a diverse set of technologies to meet the grow-
ing demands of connected devices and user data traffic. The most prominent
technologies such as mobile clouds, SDN, and NFV have their own kind of se-
curity challenges that need prompt attention due to their importance in 5G.
For example, Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) inherits the security threats
of cloud computing such as data and personal information theft, and privacy
issues [169]. Similarly, centralized control in SDN and NFV such as SDN con-
troller and NFV hypervisor can be targeted for DoS attacks [69]. Therefore,
it is highly important to analyze the security aspects of those technologies by
finding the potential security challenges, evaluating the proposed security solu-
tions for those challenges, and highlighting their weaknesses to grasp attention
for research towards those weaknesses. Table 3.3 presents the most important
reference solutions for various attacks on different technologies used in 5G.
5G will connect every aspect of the society through communication networks.
Hence, user privacy will be another pressing challenge in 5G networks [180], [181].
Henceforth, the paper provides an overview of the existing and novel security
methodologies to cope with the security challenges in each of these technologies,
as well as possible solutions for maintaining user privacy. The work presented
in Paper [VI] also sheds light on the standardization efforts on security in 5G.
The security standardization for 5G is still under the drafting phase and many
key organizations are contributing for the rapid development of security tech-
nologies and their standards. The standardization activities are also highlighted
in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.3: Security solutions for various attacks in 5G technologies
Solution Reference
Target Technology
Privacy
SDN NFV Channels Cloud
DoS, DDoS detection [104], [147] X X
Configuration [106], [107] X
Access control [89], [108], [170] X X X
Traffic isolation [162] X
Link security [86], [171] X X
Identity verification [161], [158], [119] X
Identity security [160], [172] X
Location security [173], [174] X
IMSI security [175] X
Mobile terminal security [176] X
Integrity verification [177] X
HX-DoS mitigation [178] X
Service access Control [179] X
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Table 3.4: Security activities of various standardization bodies
Standardization
bodies
Workgroups Major security
areas in focus
Milestones
3GPP Service and
System
Aspects Se-
curity Group
(SA3)
Security architec-
ture, RAN security,
authentication
mechanism, sub-
scriber privacy,
network slicing
TR 33.899: study
on the security as-
pects of next gen-
eration systems, TS
33.501: security ar-
chitecture and proce-
dures for 5G System
5GPPP 5GPPP Secu-
rity WG
Security architec-
ture, subscriber
privacy, authenti-
cation mechanism
5G PPP Security
Landscape-(White
Paper) June 2017
IETF I2NSF, DICE
WG, ACE
WG, DetNet
WG
Security solutions
for massive IoT
devices in 5G, user
privacy, Network
Security Functions
(NSFs)
RFC 8192, RFC
7744, Determin-
istic Networking
(DetNet) Security
Considerations
NGMN NGMN P1
WS1 5G
Security
Group
Subscriber privacy,
network slicing,
MEC security
5G security recom-
mendations: Pack-
age 1 and 2, and 5G
security: Package 3
ETSI ETSI TC
CYBER,
ETSI NFV
SEC WG
Security architec-
ture, NFV security,
MEC security,
privacy
ETSI GS NFV-SEC
010, ETSI GS NFV-
SEC 013 ETSI GS
NFV-SEC 006 and
ETSI GS MEC 009
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Chapter 4
Conclusion and future work
This chapter summarizes the thesis in conclusion, highlighting the contributions
and main results. Furthermore, existing problems in the scope of the thesis are
described and future research directions are presented.
4.1 Conclusion
SDN lays down the foundation for flexible and adaptable communication net-
work architectures by separating the network control plane from the data for-
warding plane. The control plane is logically centralized and implemented
in software that oversees and controls the simplified data plane through pro-
grammable interfaces. The idea of SDN is architected by OpenFlow in a three
tier architecture comprising the application plane, the control plane, and the
data plane. The control plane is capable of changing the data forwarding behav-
ior in the data plane according to requirements of applications in the application
plane. For example, OpenFlow applications can request network states such as
flow table values or packet counter values from OpenFlow switches through the
OpenFlow controller. OpenFlow applications can make decisions based on some
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algorithms, e.g. for load balancing or traffic inspection, and deploy those deci-
sions in the data plane through the controller. SDN, thus, enables new services
to manipulate the network and utilize network resources as required by users.
This thesis evaluated the potential of SDN in future networks from two
perspectives: first, investigating the potential of SDN for intelligently sharing
resources and enabling heterogeneity in future wireless networks. A centralized
control plane approach for multiple access technologies is proposed and evalu-
ated with practical experiments. Second, this thesis presented the analysis of
security of SDN and future networks such as 5G that uses SDN as one of the
main enabling technologies. The security challenges in SDN and the solutions
for those challenges are studied and future directions for increasing the secu-
rity of SDNs are outlined. The main security challenges in 5G are discussed
and the potential solutions for those challenges, including enhancing security by
leveraging SDN, are studied.
Cognitive networking aimed at making communication networks intelligent
enough to automatically respond and fulfill user needs under the constraints
of available network resources. However, the stringent nature of existing net-
works having hardware based network functions delimited the use of cognitive
networking only to the radio part. Thus, the concepts of SDN and cognitive
networking have been integrated to fulfill the promise of cognitive networking
in terms of network flexibility and adaptability beyond the radio part. The ex-
perimental evaluations show that the proposed centralized control framework,
using the currently implemented SDN architecture in the form of OpenFlow,
has capabilities to provide the necessary dynamism. The performance improve-
ment has been demonstrated in terms of throughput, packet loss, and signaling
costs, etc.
However, SDN has its own challenges and, among those, security is on the
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forefront. Therefore, this thesis discussed the security weaknesses and threats
in SDN, possible solutions for such vulnerabilities, and highlighted the unex-
plored security limitations of SDN for future research. Since 5G will connect
most aspects of the human life through the communication infrastructure, se-
curity issues must be highlighted early to seek solutions through grasping re-
search attention. This thesis evaluated the security vulnerabilities in 5G and
the technologies that 5G will use such as cloud computing, SDN, and NFV,
and presented solutions to those challenges. Having the SDN control channel
being recognized as the most critical interface in the network, this thesis also
presented a novel approach that will not only provide security to the control
channel, but will also help mobility in SDNs.
4.2 Discussion and future work
SDN will play a major role in next generation communication networks due to
the flexibility it offers through programmability and simplified network control
and management it provides through global network state visibility. Decoupling
the network control plane from the data forwarding plane and logically central-
izing the control plane has been widely accepted as the way forward, and that
is the true potential of SDN. Therefore, the main objectives of this thesis have
been to investigate the potential of SDN in its current form for the very next
generation of networks such as the fifth generation (5G) wireless networks, and
how SDN can fulfill the requirements of future networks. The thesis outlines
the benefits of using SDN in future networks through practical or experimen-
tal evaluations, highlights the potential challenges in terms of security, discusses
the security solutions for those challenges alongside the remaining loopholes and
proffers future directions for security.
However, there are still many open questions that need further investiga-
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tion. For example, the concepts of cognitive networking have been proposed
mainly to enable network automation and to eliminate or minimize the need
for human intervention. Cognitive radios have achieved a level of automation
using Software defined radios to tune-in to the available frequency channels.
Full automation that detects user service needs and then decides the selection
of frequency bands based on the service requirements is an interesting future
research question. Furthermore, a fully automated network might take a top
down approach where all the elements of a network are synchronized. Synchro-
nized here means that the network, from application to the data forwarding
plane, adjusts itself according to end-to-end goals of users, services and network
operators while optimizing the available resources.
Using the current implementation of SDN, i.e. OpenFlow, with the central-
ized controller for automated cognitive network will raise further questions also.
For example, rapid changes in user behavior or network operating conditions
will require the SDN controller to instantly adjust the network environment ac-
cordingly. In situations where changes are frequent, such as frequency hopping,
the SDN controller might be consumed to a level where it will not be able to re-
spond to network-wide goals or network configurations for other services. This
might lead to scalability challenges due to the involvement of the centralized
controller. Hence, relegating control functionalities or distributing the control
plane functionalities for cognitive networking is another interesting area that
needs further research.
In the testbed setup for experiments of SDN-based cognitive networking,
the Wireless Open-Access Research Platform (WARP) platforms had limita-
tions in terms of bandwidth. For example, on a single channel, the maximum
achievable bandwidth remained well below what 5G offers or even what existing
cellular networks offer. Therefore, with using multiple frequency channels, the
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bandwidth still remained very low, for example, approximately 6 Mbps in our
experiments. This is attributed to the limitations in WARP platforms. The
main focus of the work presented in the thesis, however, is the dynamic use
of spectrum resources in a HetNet environment using the SDN-based control
platform. Hence, the results must be seen from perspectives other than the low
bandwidth, such as the benefits of centralized control of radio resources.
As an interesting future research topic, cognitive networking needs further
investigation for automation in future communication networks. IoT will play
a major role in the near future and the number of IoT devices is expected to
grow in billions. Automatic resource provisioning for IoT, thus, will be the
key requirement of future networks. How to enable network nodes and network
segments to cooperate in order to grow and shrink in capacity at run-time will
be a key research area. Using SDN to dynamically place network functions and
automatically configure network equipment; and using cognition to sense the
needs and behavior of IoT devices with different capabilities demands further
research.
SDN has many benefits such as innovation in communication networks, sim-
plified network management and reduced costs. However, there are still many
open research challenges that need further investigation. For example, the de-
gree of involvement of SDN controller in network configurations and flow setups;
and the physical and logical or virtual placement of controllers in large networks
are some of the open questions regarding the SDN controller. The idea of decou-
pled architecture also has challenges, however. For example, fingerprinting the
decoupled architecture, and thus the control and data planes in the network, is
comparatively easy in which either of them can be targeted for security attacks.
However, SDN is inherently less vulnerable to security threats than the previous
proposals for programmable network architectures, such as active networking.
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Therefore, the use of the concepts of SDN will continue, not necessarily in its
current implementation in the form of OpenFlow, due to the many benefits it
offers.
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